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Abstract  
This paper examines social sector expenditures in fifteen Indian states between 1980/81 and
1999/2000 to find out whether the far-reaching economic reforms that began in 1991 had any
significant impact on the level and trend of these expenditures; and if there was any such
impact, what were the reasons behind the ensuing changes.  The empirical analysis in this
study shows that revenue became a major determinant of social sector expenditures from the
mid 1980s with the result that real per capita social sector expenditures in most states started
to decline even before the economic reforms began as states’ fiscal deficits worsened in the
1980s.  Economic reforms, therefore, largely did not have a major negative impact on
expenditures.  In fact there was a positive impact on some states, which often were those that
received more foreign aid than other states.  By the late 1990s, states expending more on the
social sector changed from states with a traditionally strong commitment to the social sector,to states having higher revenues including aid from outside the country.
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Abstract 
 This paper examines social sector expenditures in fifteen Indian states between 
1980/81 and 1999/2000 to find out whether the far-reaching economic reforms that 
began in 1991 had any significant impact on the level and trend of these expenditures; 
and if there was any such impact, what were the reasons behind the ensuing changes.  
The empirical analysis in this study shows that revenue became a major determinant of 
social sector expenditures from the mid 1980s with the result that real per capita social 
sector expenditures in most states started to decline even before the economic reforms 
began as states’ fiscal deficits worsened in the 1980s.  Economic reforms, therefore, 
largely did not have a major negative impact on expenditures.  In fact there was a 
positive impact on some states, which often were those that received more foreign aid 
than other states.  By the late 1990s, states expending more on the social sector 
changed from states with a traditionally strong commitment to the social sector, such as 
Kerala, to states having higher revenues including aid from outside the country. 
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Introduction 
 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have been evaluated as having a 
negative impact on social sector expenditures (Cornia, Jolly and Steward 1987; 
Kakwani, Makennen and der Gaag 1990; Steward 1995).  The reduction of fiscal 
deficits is normally included in the conditionality of SAPs and consequently 
government expenditures have to be cut in order to meet the targets for reducing fiscal 
deficits.  There are a number of studies which have pointed out the declining trend in 
social sector expenditures.  UNICEF’s Adjustment with a Human Face (Cornia, Jolly 
and Stewart 1987) was the first major criticism of SAPs to point out the negative impact 
on the vulnerable.  This study emphasized how the adjustment of developing 
economies should be improved, given that adjustment itself is necessary.  It suggested 
that meso-policy, which stands between macroeconomic and sector policies, should be 
introduced in order to protect vulnerable groups and enhance economic growth.  Public 
expenditures, among other outlays, are included in meso-policy which balances income 
and resource allocation.  Public expenditures, particularly social sector expenditures, 
play an important role not only in ensuring the basic rights of education and health but 
also in assuring investment in human resources in order to enhance economic growth 
and poverty reduction. 
As the implementing agencies of SAPs, the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) showed that social sector expenditures are not more elastic than 
expenditures on the productive and infrastructure sectors.  They also showed that there 
is a declining trend of social sector expenditures not only in adjustment countries but 
also in non-adjustment countries (Hicks and Kubish 1984; Hicks 1991; Pradhan and 
Swaroop 1993).  In the late 1980s, the World Bank recognized the need to mitigate the 
social cost of SAPs (Michaloupoulos 1987), and in response to the criticisms in 
Adjustment with a Human Face, it initiated programmes such as its Social Funds, Social 
Action Programmes and Social Aspects of Adjustment Programmes.1  Moreover, in the 
1990s, most of the SAPs had social safety nets and/or programmes aimed at maintaining 
social services.  As a result, social sector loans for basic education and health 
significantly increased in the 1990s.2  However, the IMF did not pay much attention to 
                                                  
1 There were organizational changes in the World Bank between the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s.  The Department of Population and Human Resources was created in 
1987, followed by creation of the position of Vice President in charge of Human 
Resources Development and Operation Policy in 1992. 
2 In the early 1990s, the World Bank showed a strong commitment to lending for 
education and health.  For example, President Conable pledged 1.5 billion dollars 
annually for loans to education from 1991 to 1993, out of which 30 to 40% went for 
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the social cost of SAPs until Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility-II (ESAF-II) was 
launched in 1994.   In ESAF-II, the targets for expenditures on education and health as 
set forth in the Policy Framework Paper and the Memoranda of Economic Policies were 
imposed on some structurally adjusting countries.  In 1996, the IMF and World Bank 
initiated the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and since 1999 they 
have required targeted countries to draw up a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).  
The PRSP sets down not only macroeconomic policies and structural reforms but also 
strategies for such sectors as education and health because the paper is meant to realize 
the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) which includes 
economic, social, structural, human resource, governance and environmental aspects of 
development.3  The PRSP is now required for the disbursement of the IMF’s Poverty 
Reduction Growth Facility and for loans from the International Development 
Association.  
The IMF and World Bank both stressed that they introduced conditionality to 
social policies and programmes which they both said would be effective for increasing 
social sector expenditures in developing countries (Jayarajah, Branson and Sen 1996; 
Gupta et al. 2000).  This new conditionality indicated that a new generation of SAPs 
had emerged (Van der Geest 2001) which no longer overlooked the social cost of 
structural adjustment for targeted countries.   
 As one of the countries going through structural adjustment, India was also 
expected to increase social sector expenditures.  However, most studies to date indicate 
that social sector expenditures have decreased since the economic reforms were initiated 
in 1991.  This is mainly because of the need to meet the target every fiscal year for 
reducing the fiscal deficit as shown in the budget speeches in the Indian government.  
The main targets of revenue reduction which included subsidies on food and fertilizer 
leveled off after the mid 1990s after having decreased to a certain extent because these 
subsides are related to prices which have often been major issues in the general 
elections (Kondo 2000).  On the other hand, education and health have not been major 
political issues in general elections until very recently, and social movements on 
                                                                                                                                                  
primary education.  He further projected that lending for health, nutrition and 
population matters would increase on average at 800 million dollars per year, out of 
which 3% of the total lending for primary health would increase to 5% during the same 
three-year period.  His successor President Preston planned a further substantial 
increase of these amounts (See World Bank 1992; 1993).  See also World Development 
Report 1990, which adopted a three-pronged poverty reduction strategy which included 
adequate provisions for social services (World Bank 1990). 
3 There are other CDF- and PRSP-linked mechanisms such as the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework and Sector-Wise Public Expenditure Reviews which are used 
to monitor expenditures. 
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education and health are rare except in a few states.4  As Drèze and Sen (1995) pointed 
out, India’s central and state governments are surprisingly indifferent to primary 
education; therefore it is not politically difficult for them to cut social sector 
expenditures.   
 Drèze and Sen (1995) showed that primary education and health were already 
far more widespread at the beginning of economic growth in East Asian countries than 
they are today in India, which implies that education and health have been very 
important in East Asia since human resources greatly influence the progress of 
economic growth.  The spread of education and health are not only determined by 
government expenditures, but also by the implementation of social services along with 
the provision of private services.  However, India’s low expenditures on social services 
are regarded as one of the main causes for its low social indicators (ibid.).  Social 
sector expenditures can be examined at different levels such as central government, 
state government, local government, the private sector, NGOs and the household.  This 
paper is limited to the examination of 15 major Indian states, since long-term data is 
available at the state level, and state governments are constitutionally responsible for 
providing various social services either alone or together with the central government.5  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of economic reforms on 
social sector expenditures in 15 major states of India.  It has often been pointed out 
that social sector expenditures were already the most vulnerable to reduction in the total 
budget even before India’s reforms began.  However, it has not been well examined 
whether the economic reforms were a turning point for the decline in expenditures.  
Furthermore, some earlier studies showed a reduction in social sector expenditures 
during the 1990s while some recent studies have shown an increase in social sector 
expenditures for the central government.  Whatever the case, the reasons for the 
change in expenditures have not been discussed.  This article will focus mainly on the 
following two issues: 1) whether or not economic reforms were a turning point for the 
changes in expenditures and 2) what the reasons were for the changes. 
 Section I will review the existing literature on social service expenditures (the 
term used in India’s public finance statistics and in this study, as opposed to the term 
“social sector expenditures” used by international agencies).  Section II will firstly 
discuss the expenditures of the central government, then describe state finances, and 
finally empirically examine the expenditures in the 15 states.  These 15 states (see 
                                                  
4 See for example the opinion poll in India Today, 23 February and 30 April 1998. 
5 Following amendment of the Constitution in the early 1990s, a state government can 
delegate certain responsibilities to local bodies (urban local authorities and panchayat 
institutions) with the assent of the state assembly. 
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Appendix 1) cover 96% of India’s total population and 86% of the country’s total 
geographical area according to the 1991 census.   
 
I. Review of the Literature 
 
Following independence the government of India perused an overregulated 
economic policy and took no initiative towards any radical change in social policies 
(Drèze and Sen 1995: 8).  Basu (1995) pointed out that the low budget for social 
services including education and health reflected the low priority given to these areas.  
Government officials generally chose to postpone “primary education for all” rather 
than hold back the completion of irrigation projects, and consequently when finalizing 
the annual budgets, funds were often taken from educational expenditures and shifted to 
other government programmes.  Panchamukhi (2000) found low coefficients of 
correlation between government deficits and expenditures on education and health 
between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s.   This implies that when the central 
government or state governments increased total expenditures, those for social service 
expenditures increased only a little.  This implication could also be seen after 
economic reforms in that social service expenditures declined as governments sought to 
reduce fiscal deficits. 
State governments were greatly affected by reduced fiscal transfers from the 
central government as the latter worked to lower its fiscal deficit.  The coefficients for 
education and health expenditures between state governments and the central 
government were above 0.5 in 10 of the 15 states (ibid.).  Sato (1988) analyzed fiscal 
transfers from the central government to the states between 1972 and 1984, and he was 
able to explain the structural reasons why state governments had to level off or reduce 
social service expenditures.  Fiscal transfers from the central government favored 
infrastructure investment especially in states with high per capita state domestic product 
(SDP).  Meanwhile, the use of these transfers to raise state social service expenditures 
was restricted, therefore state governments generally did not increase social service 
expenditures at the cost of increased revenue deficits.  Under this fiscal transfer system, 
states with low per capita SDP were less likely to increase social service expenditures, 
while states which strived to maintain high social service expenditures as a matter of 
state government policy were likely to experience overdraft problems and revenue 
deficits.  Ravallion and Subbarao (1992) found that Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu 
and Andhra Pradesh were states with high social service expenditures, and the 
governments of these states were traditionally at odds politically with the central 
government.  These states were politically motivated to maintain high levels of social 
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service expenditures as well as maintained fiscal discipline in order to finance such 
expenditures.  However, new economic and political trends began to emerge, and from 
the late 1980s most state governments fell into deficit, and many of them were often 
ruled by a political party different from that of the central government. 
In effect, even before the far-reaching economic reforms began in 1991, social 
service expenditures were particularly vulnerable to budget cuts (Harris-White 
1999:303) which generally affected state government social service expenditures.  
Moreover, it was difficult for state governments to increase social service expenditures 
under the existing fiscal transfer system.  Therefore, numerous studies found that 
social service expenditures declined under the pressure to reduce fiscal deficits 
following economic reforms (Gupta and Sarkar 1994; Prabhu 1994; Jalan and Subbarao 
1995; Duggal, Nandraj and Vadair 1995a, 1995b; World Bank 1995; Prabhu 1996; 
World Bank 1997b; Prabhu 1999; Swaminathan and Rawal 1999; Basu 2000; Shariff 
and Gosh 2000; Prabhu 2001; Tilak 2002).  For example, Jalan and Subbarao (1995) 
empirically examined if actual expenditures were significantly different from forecasted 
expenditures based on past trend values, and Prabhu (1996) analyzed social service 
expenditures by using indices proposed by the UNDP Human Development Report in 
1991.6  Others such as Gupata and Sarkar (1994), Prabhu (1994), Basu (2000) and 
Prabhu (2001) examined social service expenditures as a proportion of total 
expenditures, as a proportion of GDP, and as real per capita expenditures.  Using 
different methodologies, all of these studies analyzed the trend of social service 
expenditures a few years after economic reforms began, and they all in common pointed 
out the declining trend in these expenditures by state governments, except in a few 
states such as Kerala which were traditionally committed to social policy.   
An empirical study by Prabhu and Sarkar (2001) that examined the real per 
capita social service expenditures in the 15 states from 1974/75 to 1995/96 found that 
the declining trend in these expenditures started even before economic reforms began in 
1991.  By examining a longer time frame, their article found that economic reforms 
were not the turning point for changes in expenditures, although they examined only up 
to the mid 1990s.  Other studies by Shariff, Gosh and Mondal (2002) and Dev and 
Mooij (2002) analyzed social service and rural development expenditures during the 
whole of the 1990s, and these studies pointed to an increasing trend in expenditures by 
the central government in contrast to the declining trend for state governments.  
However, it was not the intention of these latter two studies to examine whether the start 
of economic reforms was a turning point for social service expenditures or what the 
reasons were for the increase in central government expenditures while those in some 
                                                  
6 See UNDP (1991). 
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states decreased. 
As indicated in the foregoing discussion, most of the literature, which covers up 
to the mid and late 1990s, agrees that state governments generally decreased social 
service expenditures in the 1990s; however, whether this was due to the economic 
reforms or was a trend that had started earlier is an issue that has still not been well 
discussed.  Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the social service expenditures of state 
governments over a longer time frame and find out the reasons why these expenditures 
started to increase or decrease in certain year in state governments. 
 
II. Social Service Expenditures in the Fifteen Major States 
 
The Constitution of India prescribes some areas such as education and family 
planning as under the concurrent jurisdiction of the central and state governments 
(Concurrent List), while areas such as public health and sanitation, hospitals and 
dispensaries, and water are in the hands of the states (State List).  Despite this 
demarcation, the main sources for social service expenditures are the state governments.  
The central government, however, has a strong influence on state government 
expenditures via its fiscal transfers which fall into these categories: 1) statutory transfers 
carried out by the Finance Commission, a constitutional body which every five year 
recommends the allocation of taxes and exercises from the central government to the 
states along with grants-in-aid to states that need additional assistance.  The 
committee’s recommendations can include funding for social sectors and services which 
can be part of upgrade grants to modernize and rationalize state administrations 
particularly in backward states, or part of special problem grants directed at 
state-specific problems.  2) regulatory transfers for financing expenditures connected 
with five-year plan programmes implemented by the National Planning Commission 
based on the Gadgil-Mookherjee formula.  3) discretionary transfers carried out by 
central government ministries.  The transfers by the National Planning Commission 
are largely loans from the central government, while discretionary transfers such as 
central sector schemes (central government projects carried out in the states) and 
centrally sponsored schemes (project finances by the central government but carried out 
by the states) are purpose-specific and by and large subsidies.  In recent years, 
anti-poverty programmes, family planning, education, caste problems and rural public 
employment have been given priority in these latter transfers (Kaneko [1994]).  They 
are therefore important for social service expenditures.7
                                                  
7 For example, family welfare is financed almost 100% by fiscal transfers from the 
central government to the states, although it is in the Concurrent List. 
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The share of the central government in total expenditures on education and 
health is only 10%; however, the central government’s share in five-year plan 
expenditures is 30% on average, and has increased to 40% in recent years.8  The 
central government, therefore, plays the major part in these plan expenditures, while 
state governments are largely responsible for non-plan expenditures that supplement 
five-year plan programmes including wages and salaries for human resources. 
As pointed out earlier, social service and rural development expenditures by the 
central government increased in the late 1990s.  However, no study has clearly pointed 
out the reasons for this trend.  It is possible to point out two reasons as far as social 
service expenditures are concerned.9  Firstly, there was an increase in external aid from 
outside the country for social services.  In 1990/91 such external assistance to social 
sectors was only 4.3% of total aid; however, this increased over the 1990s reaching 
25.9% in 1999/2000 (Table 1).  Consequently, 30% of plan expenditures on primary 
education by the central government in 2000/01 was financed by external aid (Tilak 
[2000]), and 21.1% of the government’s health budget was financed by the World Bank 
in 1999/2000.10  The World Bank group in particular, composed of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction, the International Development Association and other bodies, 
played a large role in increasing aid to social services.11  From 1971 to 1990 the social 
sector received only 3.5% of the World Bank’s project loans to India because the 
government was not really interested in aid for this area (Guhan [1995]).12  In 1991 
when the World Bank disbursed structural adjustment loans, its Country Economic 
Memorandum provided for lending to social services that included primary education, 
health, nutrition and rural water supply in order to mitigate the cost of structural 
adjustment (World Bank 1991).  This indicated large-scale loans to these areas which 
                                                  
8 Calculated based on Ministry of Finance, Indian Public Finance Statistics, various 
years; CMIE (2001); and Reserve Bank of India, Finances of State Governments, 
various years. 
9 Social and community services in the revenue and capital expenditures of the central 
government include: 1) education, art and culture, 2) scientific services and research, 3) 
medical, public health, sanitation and water supply, 4) family welfare, 5) housing, 6) 
urban development, 7) broadcasting, 8) labour and employment, 9) social security and 
welfare, 10) information and publicity, 11) other (Government of India, 2001). 
10 Calculated based on Ministry of Finance, Expenditure Budget vol.2; Personal 
communication with the Ministry of Finance. 
11 96.6% of lending to social services by the World Bank is from the International 
Development Association, based on data from the Ministry of Finance.   
12 During the same period, the figures were 14.0% for Bangladesh, 6.9% for Pakistan, 
and 7.2% for Sri Lanka.  Before economic reforms, external aid to social services in 
India was confined mainly to technical education, vocational training and population 
matters. 
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continued even after structural adjustment loans were ended in 1992.  In fact, between 
1990 and 1998, India was the largest recipient of World Bank loans for health (Gupta 
and Gumber 2002). 
The second reason for the increase in social service expenditures was the 
increase in salaries for civil servants based on the recommendation of the Fifth Central 
Pay Commission.  Expenditures in salaries and pensions for central government civil 
servants increased 33.9% over the preceding year in 1997/98 compared with 15.2% in 
1996/97 (Ministry of Finance [1999]).  This had an impact on social service 
expenditures.  For example, the growth of non-plan expenditures (in current prices) 
including for human resources became more than that of plan expenditures.  However, 
the number of central government employees was less than that of state government 
employees, therefore the growth of non-plan expenditures was not so significant.  
Therefore, the main reason for the increase in social service expenditures in the 1990s 
was also attributable to external aid, which was allocated as additional central planning 
expenditures to each state government. 
The question arises as to whether or not state government expenditures in social 
services also rose as a result of external aid.  The emphasis on social services differed 
greatly from state to state, and the trend and level of social service expenditures as well 
as the achievement of social indicators varied greatly even before economic reforms 
began.  It is well known that Kerala has maintained high social indicators despite the 
fact that its State Domestic Product (SDP) is not very high, while Uttar Pradesh has one 
of the lowest per capita SDPs and among the lowest social indicators.  Much of the 
literature reviewed earlier pointed out the declining trend in state social service 
expenditures, except in Kerala.  However, during the 20-year period examined by this 
study, economic and political circumstances changed greatly in India.  In addition to 
the commencement of economic reforms, political power and leadership changed from 
the Indian National Congress (INC) controlling both the central and state governments 
to non-INC parties controlling some states, and further still to various non-INC parties 
controlling the central government and many state governments.  Therefore, it might 
not be possible to explain the higher social service expenditures by states in recent years 
as non-INC controlled states having to increase expenditures politically in order to 
highlight their own policies. 
In analyzing the 15 major states, the four with the highest income were Haryana, 
Gujarat, Maharashtra and Punjab, since they had the highest per capita Net SDPs 
(NSDPs) during the 1980s and 1990s, while the five lowest income states were Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh (MP), Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (UP) as they had the lowest 
per capita NSDPs (Ministry of Finance 2000a:S3).  Except for Orissa, the other four 
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states in the latter category are known as BIMARU (sick) states and as backward states 
because of their low per capita NSDPs and low social indicators.  Assam could be 
included in this low income group; however it is a special category state which is given 
favorable terms and conditions for fiscal transfers from the central government.13  
Therefore this state has not been included in the lowest income group. 
 
1. State Government Finances 
The central and state governments have been suffering from fiscal deficits.  
From 1983/84 the gross fiscal deficit in all the states remained at around 3% of GDP,14 
but this worsened in the late 1990s.  The fiscal deficit of individual state governments, 
especially of the lowest income states, has been much worse, as Rao (2002) indicated.   
In 13 of the states examined in this article (excluding Assam and Punjab), the 
correlation between per capita SDP and revenue deficit is 0.438, and the correlation 
between per capita SDP and fiscal deficit is 0.446.  In the lowest income states, interest 
payments as a percentage of revenue receipts in the late 1990s increased to 23.4% in 
Rajasthan, 27.6% in Orissa and 27.3% in UP, which was worse than the 20.3% average 
for the 15 states being analyzed in this paper (Finance Commission [2001]). 
The fiscal deficits of all states worsened to above 4% of GDP in the late 1990s.  
The salaries in state governments were raised in the late 1990s, following the 
recommendation of the Fifth Pay Commission.  Salary related expenditures have come 
to absorb over two-thirds and in some states nearly three-fourths of revenue receipts 
since the pay scales of some states are higher than those of the central government for  
employees in certain categories (ibid.:9).  In fact, the gross primary deficit (gross fiscal 
deficit minus interest payments) and the revenue deficit have worsened, meaning that 
salaries and pensions are a heavier burden than interest payments for all 15 states.  The 
expenditures for merit social services associated with strong externalities such as 
elementary education and public health are half of those for non-merit social services 
such as general education and medicines (Srinivastava and Sen 1997).  However, the 
cost recovery rate for non-merit services is low.  Moreover, the trend line for fiscal 
transfers from the central government as a share of GDP has stagnated in recent years, 
mainly due to the fiscal deficit of the central government.  State tax revenues also have 
                                                  
13 The special category states are: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, 
Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripra.  
These states are located on the borders of the country, are economically backward and 
possess strong anti-government military groups; therefore regulatory transfers to these 
special category states are 90% in grants and 10% in loans, while the same transfers to 
the other states are 70% in loans and 30% in grants. 
14 Calculated from Reserve Bank of India (2001).   
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not increased much.  As a result, state governments have been suffering from growing 
salary expenditures and a lack of revenue which has led to a worsening of fiscal deficits 
since the late 1990s. 
Social service expenditures have been disbursed mainly from the revenue 
account.  In most states the growth of revenue account expenditures in the 1990s was 
less than in the 1980s.  In the 1980s state governments kept their capital account in the 
black in order to finance their revenue deficit (Kaneko [1993]); however, as revenue 
deficits have worsened since the late 1980s, social service expenditures from the 
revenue account have had to be reined in. 
 For all 15 states, development expenditures, including for economic and social 
services, as a share of the total expenditures reached 63.78% in 1987/88 and have 
declined since then.  Likewise in individual states, non-development expenditures have 
been crowding out development expenditures as a share of total expenditures. 
This de-emphasis of development expenditures has led to insufficient 
disbursement and provision of social services, which has had an impact on those who 
have to rely sorely on public education and health services.  The All India Education 
Survey carried out in 1993 showed that 80.8% of children in Class I to V go to public 
school (NCERT 1998:1S135), while the National Council for Applied Economic 
Research (NCAER) Survey showed that 68.0% of children 6 to 14 years old are in 
public school.  In both surveys, the figures reached above 90% if private schools 
assisted financially by the government were included.  In health services, the share of 
private sector users is much higher than that in education; 71.5% of those in the first 
income quintile use private facilities, but only 45.2% of people in the fifth income 
quintile do so (Garg 1998). 
In various budget speeches after economic reforms began, the central 
government repeatedly stated that it would pay attention to protecting the poor and to 
human resource development as economic reforms progressed (see for example, 
Government of India 1991; Government of India 1992; Government of India 1996).  
Have the state governments also been concerned about these areas? 
 
2. Social Service Expenditures in the Fifteen States 
 
Financial statistics for examining state finances between 1980/81 and 
1999/2000 were obtained from the Reserve Bank of India, Finances of State 
Government (after 1997/98 retitled State Finances: A Study of State Budgets); net SDP 
and SDP deflators were obtained from the Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of 
Statistics on the Indian Economy (2001).  Mid-year population figures were from the 
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Central Statistical Organisation’s Statistical Abstract India, various years.  Social 
services include 1) education, sports, art and culture, 2) medical and public health, 3) 
family welfare, 4) water supply and sanitation, 5) housing, 6) urban development, 7) 
welfare of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward classes, 8) labour and 
labour welfare, 9) social security and welfare, 10) nutrition, 11) relief for national 
calamities and 12) other.  Please note that “education” in this article includes: 
education, sports, art and culture, and “health” includes: medical and public health, 
family welfare and water supply and sanitation, since there were categorical changes in 
the statistics during the 20 years.  As has been mentioned, social service expenditures 
are mainly from the revenue account, being more than 95% between 1988/89 and 
1990/91 (Prabhu 1999a).  However, this study includes both expenditures from the 
revenue account and capital account, since the latter sometimes plays an important role 
in supplementing decreased revenue expenditures, as will be mentioned later.15  It 
should be noted that discretionary transfers from the central government to the states, 
such as centrally sponsored schemes, are recorded in the expenditures of both the 
central and state governments.  Therefore merely adding both expenditures is far larger 
than the combined expenditures that appear in the statistics.  In this article, 
discretionary transfers have not been deducted from state government expenditures 
since only state government expenditures are being examined. 
Looking at the share of social service expenditures in total expenditures, it 
stood at around 30% for all 15 states during the 20 years, but the difference between the 
states with the highest and lowest shares declined from 22.88% in 1980/81 to 14.19% in 
1999/2000.  There were primarily two reasons for this.  Traditionally high 
expenditure states, such as AP, Kerala and West Bengal, reduced their expenditures 
(Figure 1).  On the other hand, the lowest income states increased their expenditures 
from just around 30% in the 1980s to the mid and high 30 percent level in the 1990s, 
which was catching up with other states.   
Figure 2 shows social service expenditures as a share of NSDP.  The 
expenditures in all the states leveled off at 4% to 5% over the 20 years.  Expenditures 
in the highest income states remained low throughout the 20 years, while those in 
Kerala decreased to the same level as the lowest income states, which was around 8% of 
NSDP.  The gap between the highest and lowest expenditure states was 5.20% in 
1998/99 which was almost the same at the 5.59% in 1980/81.  However, it is 
noteworthy that the lowest expenditure states during the 20 years were some of the 
highest income states, while the highest expenditure state had been Kerala until 1990/91 
                                                  
15 However, loans and advances by state governments from the capital account for 
social and economic services are not included.  
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(except for Rajasthan in 1987/88), which became one of the lowest income states after 
1991/92. 
Education and health expenditures showed basically the same trend as that of 
social service expenditures.  The expenditures of the lowest income states increased 
during the 1980s and caught up with the other states in the 1990s.  Conversely, 
expenditures in Kerala remained the highest in the 1980s but declined towards the latter 
half of the 1990s, and the state was eventually surpassed even by the lowest income 
states.  The highest income states maintained low levels of expenditures that even 
declined in the late 1990s, especially for education.  Shariff and Ghosh (2000) 
estimated that coefficients of correlation between per capita NSDP and the proportion of 
NSDP spent on education increased over the years, ?0.19 (1980/81), ?0.36(1985/86), 
?0.49 (1990/91) and ?0.51(1995/96), although these are not statistically significant 
figures. 
Despite the differences in the trends and levels of expenditures among the 
states, there is one common feature as far as education expenditures are concerned.  In 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s, expenditures on social services as a share of total 
expenditures decreased or at best stagnated.  Education expenditures also declined for 
a time although this trend later stopped or showed an increase in expenditures (Figure 3).  
Despite the overall declining trend of social service expenditures, state governments 
avoided reducing education expenditures which generally make up more than 50% of 
social service expenditures.  However, to maintain education expenditures, the states 
reduced health and other expenditures.  The ratio of health expenditures to NSDP for 
all the states peaked in the early 1980s, which was earlier than the peak for education 
expenditures, and has dropped since then.  Moreover, the expenditure level for health 
did not recover to the level of the peak period of time.  Even in Kerala, health 
expenditures, unlike education expenditures, stood only a little above those of the other 
states.  The gap between Kerala and the lowest income states grew smaller during the 
1980s, and the state was surpassed by the lowest income states in the 1990s. 
Looking at real per capita expenditures (in 1980/81 prices), the highest income 
states showed a lower proportion of expenditures to total income as well as to NSDP 
(Figure 4), mainly due to the high level of their total expenditures and NSDPs.  
However, the graph shows that per capita expenditures in these states were as high as 
those of Kerala.  Moreover, Rajasthan, one of the lowest income states, caught up with 
Kerala, despite the latter’s lower level of population growth.  It is clear that Kerala’s 
expenditures have not much exceeded those of the other states in recent years.  Among 
the lowest income states, Rajasthan is an exception, and the gap between the two lowest 
income states, namely Bihar and UP, and the rest of the states is huge with no sign at all 
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of any narrowing.   
 From the above analysis, two features are clear about social service 
expenditures.  First, states like Kerala that have traditionally had a strong commitment 
to social policy showed a decline or at best stagnation in expenditures.  On the other 
hand, the expenditures of the lowest income states increased and sometimes even 
surpassed Kerala.  Why did this change occur?  It would seem that the determinant of 
social service expenditures shifted from how much state governments put priority on 
social services to how much revenue they had.  Using Spearman’s Correlation between 
social service expenditures and state revenue, both in proportion to NSDPs, Table 2 
shows that from the mid 1980s the correlations between social services and revenue in 
the revenue account, especially from tax revenue and grants from the central 
government, were high.16  It is clear that states with higher revenue could have higher 
expenditures on social services, which implies that their political commitment to social 
services was less likely to be a major determinant of expenditures, although political 
relations between the central government and the states needs to be analyzed further.   
The second feature of social service expenditures is that some states showed a 
declining trend from the beginning of economic reform in 1991; however, 1991 was not 
always the turning point for the decline of these expenditures.  The next section will 
examine the years of shift when expenditure began to decline which will show the 
impact of economic reforms.  This will also lead to specifying the causes for 
expenditure increase or decrease by clarifying the year when expenditures shifted. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
As mentioned in the review of the literature, some studies pointed to a 
declining trend in social service expenditures after the initiation of economic reforms in 
1991.  On the other hand, Prabhu and Sarkar (2001) empirically examined real per 
capita expenditures for social services from the revenue account between 1974/75 and 
1995/96 in the 15 major states and showed that the declining trend started even before 
economic reforms began.  The trend that they observed can be estimated by the 
following equation. 
 
LnYt = α + βt + γ (t – t*) Dt + ut?       (1) 
 
                                                  
16 Prabhu and Iyer (2001) pointed out the high correlation between the ratio of tax 
revenue to NSDP and the ratio of social service expenditures to NSDP between 1991/92 
and 1994/95. 
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Where  
Yt ?  real per capita expenditure (in 1980/81 prices) at year t 
t* =   fiscal year of expenditure trend shift 
Dt =  slope dummy variable?1 for years after t*, zero otherwise? 
ut?  error term 
  
The purpose of equation is to specify the fiscal year of the shift in per capita 
real expenditures.  β represents the growth rate and the coefficient γ resents the 
magnitude of the shift in the growth rate of the year t*.  Therefore the sign and value 
of γ shows the direction and magnitude of the shift respectively, provided the coefficient 
is found to be significant (ibid).  The results of regression analysis show that even 
before economic reforms began, 12 states had a decline in social service expenditures, 6 
states a decline in education expenditures, and 10 states a decline in health expenditures; 
only in Bihar was there a decline in health expenditures in 1991/92 after economic 
reforms began. 
We will now analyze the longer term 1980/81 to 1999/2000 impact of 
economic reforms on social service expenditures in the 15 states.  We will examine 
real per capita expenditures since there was a diversity of the growth rates in the SDPs 
as well as the growth rates of per capita SDPs among the states in the 1990s (Ahluwalia 
2000).  Moreover, the population growth rates were different from states to states.  
For example, the natural growth rate for India as a whole was 17.3 % compared with 
11.5% in Kerala, 23.1% in Bihar, 21.0% in MP, 22.8% in Rajasthan and 22.5% in UP 
(Registrar General 2001). 
Equation (1) includes only slope dummy variables to examine the shift in 
expenditure trend, but this study’s equation will include intercept dummy variables in 
addition to slope dummy variable.  This will enable us to find not only the shift in 
expenditure TREND but also the shift in expenditure LEVEL.  The hypothesis is that 
there is a year of shift both before and after economic reforms.  The regression 
exercise is carried out by OLS, and the equation is as follows. 
 
ln Yt =  α + β1t + β2D1? β3 (t – t*) D1 + β?D2 ?β??t?t**?D2?ut (2) 
 
Where  
Yt? ?real per capita expenditure (in 1980/81 prices) at year t 
t*= first fiscal year of expenditure shift 
t**?second fiscal year of expenditure shift 
D??dummy valuables until t*?? for year after t*?zero otherwise? 
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D??dummy valuables until t**?? for year after t**, zero otherwise? 
ut?error term 
 
Parameter β1 represents the growth rate?β2 and β?represent the effect of the 
shift in level?β3 and β? represent the effect of shift in trend.  The coefficients of β2, β3, 
β? and β?  represent the sign of shift in trend and level, provided they are found to be 
statistically significant.  The procedure for finding the shift year is to identify the 
optimal values of t* and t** by doing regression exercises either having 1) maximum 
r-square or 2) maximum value of t-statistics for the coefficients β2, β3, β?and β? (ibid).  
This model might not be able to find the second downward or upward trend or level 
after economic reforms if expenditures already show a downward or upward trend or 
level before economic reforms.  When making a graph of expenditures, only the 
social services in Tamil Nadu might exhibit this outcome, but this is not the case of 
either having 1) maximum r-square or 2) maximum value of t-statistics for 
coefficientsβ2, β3, β?and β?.  Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the results. 
 
4. Results and Explanation 
 
For all the states of India, including the 15 major states examined in this study, 
the level of expenditures for social services and education declined in 1991/92, which 
would make it appear that economic reforms affected these expenditures negatively.  
However, the results for the 15 major states were not uniform.  Ten states in social 
services, 13 states in education and 12 states in health experienced a downward shift in 
the level and/or trend of expenditures before economic reforms began.  That means the 
downward trends were not simply the result of economic reforms, but were continuing 
trends from the pre-economic reform period. 
A regression exercise for economic services in development expenditures will 
prove that the expenditures for social services declined even before the start of 
economic reforms (Table 6).  Economic services consist of 1) agriculture and allied 
activities, 2) rural development, 3) special area programmes, 4) irrigation and flood 
control, 5) energy, 6) industry and minerals, 7) transport and communications, 8) 
science, technology and environment, and 9) general economic services.  The trend of 
expenditures for economic services declined in all 15 states in 1991/92, and for eight 
out of 13 states, the year of significant downward shift in the level or trend of these 
expenditures came after 1991.  This would increase to 10 out of 13 states if 1990/91 
were included.  Except for Kerala, most of the states maintained their level of 
economic service expenditures until economic reforms were initiated in 1991.  These 
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expenditures declined in order to reduce development expenditures, as part of the 
reduction of fiscal deficits.  Thus it would seem that economic reforms affected 
economic service expenditures negatively in most states.  Only Kerala showed an 
upward trend in expenditures on these services after economic reforms began. 
There were three main reasons why state governments started reducing social 
service expenditures in the 1980s.  Firstly, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
strengthened its overdraft regulation in 1985.  From that year, the RBI began 
suspending payments when a bank’s overdraft continued for more than seven 
consecutive working days; this was changed to ten consecutive working days in 1993.  
This indicated that from the mid 1980s there was more pressure on state governments to 
control expenditures.  Secondly, state governments increased civil servant salaries and 
pensions in the mid 1980s following the recommendation of the Fourth Central Pay 
Commission.  This increase coupled with rising interest payments on the states’ 
growing debt issues meant that development expenditures had to be reduced in order to 
pay for salaries and pensions in non-development expenditures.  As already pointed 
out, most of the states started to reduce development expenditures in the mid 1980s, 
which means that social service expenditures have been sacrificed since the mid 1980s.  
Thirdly, the reduction of transfers from the central government since the mid 1980s has 
also played a role in the decline of social service expenditures.  Prabhu and Sarkar 
(2001: 57) pointed out that the sharp jump in BRG3, which quantifies the extent that 
states are dependent on resources over which they have no control, seems to coincident 
with an expenditure shift in a given fiscal year. 17   BRG3 is financed by 1) 
non-statutory transfers, 2) loans and advances from the central government, 3) market 
loans, and 4) ways and means advances.  In all 10 states having a year of significant 
downward shift in social service expenditures (Table 3), that year is coincident with the 
year of increasing resource gap (BRG3) or is one year earlier.  This implies that state 
governments adjusted social service expenditures in the year or one year after having 
obtained fewer resources they did not control.  This is in accord with our hypothesis 
that revenue has played an important role in the level and trend of state expenditures for 
social services since the mid 1980s. 
The empirical results of this study have two major conclusions that differ 
from Prabhu and Sarkar (2001).  The first concerns their evaluation of Kerala state 
                                                  
17 According to Pattnaik et al. (1994), BRG 3 is calculated as follows.  BRG3= 
(Revenue Expenditure + Capital Disbursement) ? {(State’s Own Tax Revenue + 
State’s Own Non-Tax Revenue + State’s Share in Central Taxes + Statutory Grants) + 
(Internal Debt?Market Loans)} ? (Provident Funds + Revenue Fund and Deposits + 
Other Capital Receipts)} 
 17
where they concluded that social and education expenditures increased after economic 
reforms.  However, this article shows that there was an upward trend in social service 
expenditures but a downward one in education expenditure in Kerala before economic 
reforms.  This study analyzed total expenditures (revenue expenditures plus capital 
outlays) until the end of the 1990s using intercept and slope dummy variables.  These 
differences in the terms of years chosen and dummy variables used in analyzing 
expenditures might have led to the different conclusions.  Secondly, Prabhu and Sarkar 
(2001) found that all the expenditures, except for social services and education in Kerala 
and health in Bihar (which turned downward in 1991/92), showed a declining trend 
from the economic reforms, while this article shows there were both upward and 
downward (or level) trends in some states after the economic reforms began.18  There 
were three states that showed some downward trends after 1991.  One was Kerala in 
education expenditures.  Although the number of school children decreased in Kerala, 
the state has traditionally been committed to providing social services.  For example, 
the state’s health expenditures clearly show that capital outlays were increased while 
revenue expenditures dropped (Figure 3).  If we carry out a regression exercise on 
capital outlays for health in Kerala, it was in 1983/84 that the expenditure level shifted 
upward.  Compared to the regression exercise on total health expenditures, it is clear 
that Kerala maintained total health expenditures by increasing capital outlays until 
1990/91 (Figure 3 and Table 5), which implies a strong commitment to health services.  
In the 1990s immediately after the start of economic reforms, health expenditures 
declined first followed by education expenditures, mainly due to Kerala’s deepening 
revenue deficit.  However, the high priority on social services was regarded as the 
main cause for economic stagnation in the state which made it easier for the state 
government to reduce social service expenditures (George 1993).  Furthermore, the 
expenditure growth rates after the years of downward shift were 0.6% in education and 
?1.1? in health.  The level of total social service expenditures increased in 1985/86 
due to increasing relief for national calamities, however the expenditure growth rate 
between 1985/86 and 1999/2000 was only 1.9%.  The growth rate for expenditures for 
economic services, on the other hand, showed an upward trend from 1991/92, and the 
growth rate of expenditures after that year reached 4.2%. 
Other declines in expenditures after economic reforms were the level of health 
                                                  
18 Most state governments raised salaries and pensions following the recommendation 
of the fifth pay commission, which might have contributed to raising social service 
expenditures in 1999/2000.  Rao (2002) pointed out that the share of social 
expenditures in GDP was 4.9% in 1990/91, which decreased to 4.6% in 1998/99 and 
rose again to 5.0% in 1999/2000 due to the rise in salaries.  In this study’s regression 
exercise, however, no state showed an increasing level or trend in 1999/2000. 
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expenditures in Bihar and the trend of health expenditures in Assam.  These three 
states, namely Kerala, Bihar and Assam, were also the lowest three recipients of 
external aid from outside the country (Table 7).  The external aid shown in the table 
includes not only that for social services but also for other areas, and there is no 
available disaggregated data on external aid to multiple states.  However, at least it is 
certain that such aid play a role in states which showed an upward trend or level after 
the economic reforms.  The proportion of external aid with the central government as 
the recipient was 66.76% in 1991/92; however, this declined after the mid 1990s to 
19.20% in 1999/2000 (Ministry of Finance 2000b).  Consequently, some state 
governments received more external aid than other states.  The greatest beneficiary 
was Andhra Pradesh, which received 14.33% of total external aid in 1999/2000.  All 
the expenditures for social services, education and health in Andhra Pradesh showed a 
downward trend in 1980s; however this changed to an upward one in the mid 1990s.  
This was attributable to moves by the state’s ruling party, the Telgu Desam Party, which 
won the assembly election in December 1994.  From the mid 1990s, Andhra Pradesh 
started to seek out private investment and loans from the World Bank in order to 
manage its fiscal crisis brought on by declining revenues due to the prohibition of 
alcohol sales and increasing expenditures for such things as huge subsidies to rice (one 
kg two rupees policy) as well as extensive damage by cyclones in 1996.  As a result, 
half of the World Bank loans to India go to Andhra Pradesh where education, water and 
sanitation, and nutrition have become priority areas for funding from external sources.19
Other states, such as UP, Karnataka, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Orissa, also 
showed upward trends after the economic reforms because of increased expenditures 
made possible by external aid from places like the World Bank.20  At the same time 
                                                  
19http://www/andhrapradesh.com/apwebsite/achievements/externallyaidedprojects1.htm 
(accessed on 26 February 2002). 
20 In Uttar Pradesh, social services particularly for welfare for scheduled castes (SC), 
scheduled tribes (ST) and other backward classes (OBC) increased from 1994/95.  In 
the breakdown of welfare for SC, ST and OBC, the share for education was quite high 
(see Government of Uttar Pradesh, 1995).  Therefore, funds for primary education 
disbursed by the World Bank played an important role in the increase.  In Karnataka, 
health expenditures increased in 1996/97, because funds for rural water supply and 
sanitation projects (92 million dollars), approved by the World Bank in 1992, were 
finally disbursed in 1996/97, and after that Japan and France started water supply 
projects in the same state.  Moreover, since 1997/98 the state government under the 
Janata Dal Party started a rural sanitation programme funded at 100 million rupees 
annually (personal communication from N. Sivasaliam, 2002).  In Maharashtra, health 
expenditures increased in 1991/92 because three water supply and sanitation projects 
were funded by the World Bank from the late 1980s.  Along with this, the Shiv Sena 
Party and Bharatiya Janata Party, which won in the February 1995 assembly election, 
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however, there were states that increased their own budget allocations for social services.  
These states were the highest income states of Haryana and Punjab.  Both states had a 
high per capita income and low level of population under the poverty line.  Real per 
capita expenditures of both exceeded that of Kerala, and the regression analysis showed 
an upward trend in health expenditures for Haryana and in all expenditures for Punjab.  
The upward trend in these states was due to the greater allocation of revenue 
expenditures to education and health (Joshi, Bhide and Sood [2001]), and external aid to 
both states was limited.  Under the existing fiscal systems, this led to further revenue 
deficits, particularly in Punjab. 
 The regression analysis indicates that external aid to state governments for 
social services became important in increasing social service expenditures as the overall 
trend in fiscal transfers from the central government diminished, such as the decline in 
loans as a proportion of GDP from the mid 1980s, followed by the declining trend of 
grants as a proportion of GDP after the start of economic reforms.  In this situation, 
obtaining revenues including external aid, particularly grants, was important for each 
state government and proved to be a major determinant of social service expenditures.  
As is well known, external aid was not disbursed to the state governments directly, but 
was passed on to the concerned states as additional central government assistance.  
Therefore, irrespective of the original terms and conditions set by the external provider, 
external aid was transferred as 70% loans and 30% grants to the general category states 
and 10% loans and 90% grants to the special category states.  This implies two things: 
1) social services, which were often soft loans or grants in assistance portfolio, were 
required to pay an additional burden in comparison with the original terms and 
                                                                                                                                                  
gave higher priority to drinking water.  They established a department of water supply 
and sanitation and initiated a master plan for each district (Government of Maharashtra, 
1996a; 1996b).  In West Bengal, social service expenditures increased in 1997/98 
because of external aid used for such things as state health system development 
(approved by the World Bank in 1996), Kolkata environmental upgrading (approved by 
the Asian Development Bank in 1998), a district primary education programme and 
poverty reduction in Kolkata, and a reproductive health project funded by the 
Department for International Development (DFID 2000).  In Orissa, education and 
health expenditures increased in 1995/96 and 1996/97 respectively.  The state 
benefited from a district primary education programme (1996/97-2002/03), a water 
resource strengthening project (1995/96-2003/04) and health system development 
(1998/99-2003/04), all funded by the World Bank.  There was also funding from the 
upgrade fund of the Tenth Finance Commission for promoting such things as female 
education, and drinking water in schools (Finance Commission, 1994).  The Orissa 
state government also started a rural sanitation programme and total sanitation 
campaign in 1997/98 (http://www.orissagov.com/rd/sanitation.htm; 
http:///www.orissagov.com/rd/rdach.htm, accessed on July 2002). 
 20
conditions to help sustain the relatively larger share of high cost loans, such as for 
commercial and infrastructure projects; 2) the transfer of external assistance for social 
services to states was disadvantageous especially for low income states.  At the same 
time, states with little external aid had to finance social services through their own 
revenues, which confronted them with deficits in the revenue account under the existing 
fiscal and fiscal transfer system.  Given the structural constraints, each state 
government on its own had to increase revenues including external aid to finance 
expenditures needed for expanding state social services that also covered the poor. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Real per capita social service expenditures in most of the 15 major states 
analyzed in this study started to decline in the 1980s due to their worsening fiscal 
situation.  The trends in expenditures after 1991 were a continuation those from the 
pre-economic reform period.  It is clear that state revenue procurement was sluggish 
from the mid 1980s which was a major determinant of social service expenditures in 
each state. 
Some states received increased external aid or allocated more of their own 
budget to social services, which led to a rise in social service expenditures after 
economic reforms began.  States politically committed to social services, such as 
Kerala, faced revenue deficits as a result of high social service expenditures under the 
existing fiscal system.  Kerala is no longer one of the states with the highest 
expenditures for social services.  Instead, states with higher expenditures for these 
services are those with higher revenue including that from external aid. 
Worse still, even before economic reforms there was a decrease in expenditures 
in states with already low levels of expenditures and low social indicators, while health 
expenditures in Bihar declined after economic reforms.  Except for expenditures on 
social services in UP, and on health and education in Orissa, the lowest income states 
did not increase expenditures after economic reforms because it was difficult for them 
to obtain revenue to cover the high cost of social service expenditures. 
It is clear that the de facto privatization of social services, reflected in the 
growing prevalence of private schools and hospitals, became prominent in the 1980s in 
many states, which is when the empirical analysis in this study shows the trends and/or 
levels of expenditures declined.  Total expenditures on social services in both the 
public and private sectors were estimated to have reached 6% of GDP by the 1990s 
(Tilak 1995, World Bank 1995, Mukhopadhyay 1997), which the central government 
had set as its national target for these expenditures.  This implies that private sector 
expenditures came to exceed public sector expenditures, since public spending by the 
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central and state governments is estimated at around 3% for education and nearing 2% 
for health.  The central and state governments implicitly accepted the emergence of the 
private sector, and following economic reforms private sector participation was 
encouraged all the more.  However, de facto privatization or the increase of external 
aid does not automatically extend social services to the poor or the unprivileged.  It 
needs to be stressed that state governments, particularly the lowest income states, need 
to obtain revenue including external aid in order to deliver social services to the 
grassroots level.   The existing system where external aid is transferred from the 
central government to the states needs to be reconsidered, and particularly for the lowest 
income states, grants from the central government, either using its own revenues or 
using transfers of external aid, are needed since they have become a major determinant 
of social service expenditures in each state as shown in the analysis of this study.21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
21 A change recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission was for the central 
government to transfer external aid to the states on the same terms and conditions that 
the external assisting agencies attached to the aid (Finance Commission, 2004). 
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Appendix 1?Abbreviations of State Names
Abbreviations State Names
AP Andhra Pradesh
AS Assam
BH Bihar
GJ Gujarat
HY Haryana
KA Karnataka
KE Kerala
MP Madhya Pradesh
MH Maharashtra
OR Orissa
PJ Punjab
RJ Rajasthan
TN Tamil Nadu
UP Uttar Pradesh
WB West Bengal
 
 
 
Table 1 Disbursed External Aid in the 1990s ?amount in crore rupees?
Total External Aid 
amount amount share of totalexternal aid (%) amount
share of external
aid for social
services (%)
1990/91 6,124 260 (4.25) 155 (59.54)
1991/92 10,005 436 (4.36) 229 (52.56)
1992/93 9,841 491 (4.99) 367 (74.70)
1993/94 10,116 594 (5.87) 442 (74.43)
1994/95 9,530 968 (10.16) 791 (81.74)
1995/96 8,710 1,113 (12.78) 803 (72.17)
1996/97 10,052 1,482 (14.74) 1,195 (80.64)
1997/98 8,498 1,638 (19.28) 1,280 (78.16)
1998/99 9,925 2,503 (25.22) 1,804 (72.06)
1999/00 10,994 2,850 (25.92) 2,064 (72.41)
Note: crore rupees is equivalent to 10 million rupees.
Sources:
Social Services funded
through External Aid
Social Services funded by
World Bank Group ?IDA +
IBRD?
Compiled from Government of India (2000) and personal communication with the
Ministry of Finance.  
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Table 2 Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient: Social Services and Revenues in 15 States
Fiscal Year
Tax
Revenues
Non-Tax
Revenue
Grants from
Central
Government
Total
Revenue
Receipts
Loans and
Advances from
Central
Government
Total
(Revenue and
Capital)
Receipts
80/81 0.24 0.43 0.53* 0.76* 0.44 0.69*
(0.3977) (0.1143) (0.0428) (0.0009) (0.0983) (0.0045)
81/82 0.40 0.43 0.57* 0.59* 0.17 0.75*
(0.1435) (0.1110) (0.0261) (0.0208) (0.5413) (0.0014)
82/83 0.28 0.18 0.41 0.65* 0.01 0.68*
(0.3212) (0.5327) (0.1283) (0.0092) (0.9597) (0.0058)
83/84 0.33 -0.03 0.47 0.52* -0.07 0.43
(0.2318) (0.9244) (0.0786) (0.0480) (0.8003) (0.1110)
84/85 0.38 0.22 0.49 0.51 -0.09 0.36
(0.1598) (0.4354) (0.0620) (0.0537) (0.7613) (0.1819)
85/86 0.64* 0.40 0.55* 0.85* 0.17 0.84*
(0.0109) (0.1396) (0.0337) (<0.0001) (0.5499) (<0.0001)
86/87 0.57* 0.30 0.48 0.80* -0.19 0.75*
(0.0272) (0.2773) (0.0736) (0.0003) (0.4948) (0.0013)
87/88 0.46 0.53* 0.53* 0.83* 0.37 0.88*
(0.0813) (0.0412) (0.0428) (0.0002) (0.1728) (<0.0001)
88/89 0.19 0.39 0.52* 0.81* 0.23 0.88*
(0.4910) (0.1515) (0.0462) (0.0002) (0.4126) (<0.0001)
89/90 0.66* 0.38 0.67* 0.88* 0.22 0.84*
(0.0078) (0.1641) (0.0065) (<0.0001) (0.4277) (<0.0001)
90/91 0.68* 0.41 0.63* 0.84* 0.13 0.73*
(0.0051) (0.1320) (0.0115) (0.0001) (0.6387) (0.0022)
91/92 0.55* 0.33 0.69* 0.83* 0.12 0.70*
(0.0337) (0.2265) (0.0045) (0.0001) (0.6757) (0.0039)
92/93 0.62* 0.68* 0.77* 0.87* 0.27 0.48
(0.0134) (0.0051) (0.0008) (<0.0001) (0.3278) (0.0687)
93/94 0.64* 0.51 0.75* 0.84* 0.04 0.80*
(0.0097) (0.0517) (0.0013) (<0.0001) (0.8894) (0.0003)
94/95 0.52 0.38 0.85* 0.74* 0.21 0.58*
(0.0480) (0.1684) (<0.0001) (0.0016) (0.4510) (0.0228)
95/96 0.64* 0.41 0.75* 0.75* 0.42 0.67*
(0.0103) (0.1320) (0.0012) (0.012) (0.1212) (0.0061)
96/97 0.73* 0.25 0.77* 0.69* 0.03 0.65*
(0.0021) (0.3618) (0.0008) (0.0042) (0.9095) (0.0121)
97/98 0.60* 0.35 0.93* 0.84* 0.19 0.84*
(0.0172) (0.2059) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.4910) (0.0001)
98/99 0.62* 0.49 0.69* 0.86* -0.12 0.68*
(0.0141) (0.0664) (0.0048) (<0.0001) (0.6664) (0.0054)
Note 1. figures in Brackets are p-values.
2. N= 15, except for N=14 of total receipts in 1996/97.
3. * reprents statistical  significance at 5%.  
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Table 3 Evaluation of Social Service Expenditures
States α β1
β? and β?
(if any)
β? and β?
( if any? R2 D-W Year of Shift
Direction
of Shift
(Level)
Direction
of Shift
(Trend)
No. of
Samples
AP 4.52*** 0.06* 0.24*** -0.07* 0.96 2.16 1983/84 D U 20
(62.17) (1.9) (3.09) (-2.02)
- - 0.01 0.09*** - - 1994/95 U - -
(0.26) (7.32)
AS 4.31*** 0.09*** -0.03 -0.07*** 0.93 2.24 1986/87 D - 19
(75.79) (5.87) (-0.42) (-4.65)
BH 4.16*** 0.03*** 0.05 -0.05*** 0.73 1.71 1990/91 D - 19
(75.43) (3.8) (0.68) (-3.39)
GJ 4.68*** 0.07*** -0.09* -0.06*** 0.96 2.91 1988/89 D D 17
(145.54) (10.71) (-2.1) (-7.1)
HY 4.66*** 0.07*** -0.01 -0.05*** 0.88 1.60 1988/89 D - 20
(66.93) (4.87) (-0.16) (-3.08)
KA# 2.23 0.25** -0.03 -0.16** 0.97 2.96 1987/88 D - 19
(1.07) (2.53) (-0.43) (-2.83)
KE 5.01*** -0.01 0.19** 0.03 0.81 1.93 1985/86 - U 19
(73.13) (-0.61) (2.48) (1.26)
MP 4.27*** 0.06*** -0.15*** -0.03*** 0.97 1.48 1989/90 D D 19
(146.58) (12.14) (-3.92) (-4.28)
MH - - - - - - 1980/81 N - -
OR - - - - - - 1980/81 N - -
PJ 4.88*** 0.05*** 0.13 -0.12*** 0.87 2.34 1988/89 D - 20
(74.4) (4.19) (1.5) (-5.14)
- - -0.003 0.18*** - - 1994/95 U - -
(-0.03) (6.27)
RJ - - - - - - 1980/81 N - -
TN 4.49*** 0.10*** -0.05 -0.06** 0.95 1.30 1985/86 D - 20
(64.21) (4.65) (-0.67) (-2.78)
UP 4.12*** 0.05*** 0.03 -0.09** 0.96 1.67 1990/91 D - 20
(131.1) (10.54) (0.61) (-2.81)
- - -0.06 0.09** - - 1993/94 U - -
(-0.80) (2.62)
WB 4.63*** 0.03*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.92 2.74 1997/98 U - 21
(113.03) (6.68) (0.27) (3.81)
All 5.66 0.05 -0.21* -0.01 0.79 2.05 1991/92 - D 20
(77.77) (4.78) (-2.11) (-0.36)
Notes: 1. # regression exercise by AR1.
2. ***, **, and  * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
3. direction of shift: D= downward, U= upward, N= no significant shift
4. figures in brackets are t-values.  
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Table 4 Evaluation of Education Expenditures 
States α β1
β? and β?
(if any)
β? and β?
( if any? R2 D-W Year of Shift
Direction
of Shift
(Level)
Direction
of Shift
(Trend)
No. of
Samples
AP 3.82*** 0.5*** 0.03 -0.08*** 0.90 1.55 1989/90 D - 20
(85.53) (6.23) (0.42) (-4.83)
- - -0.05 0.13*** - - 1995/96 U - -
(-0.67) (5.4)
AS 3.78*** 0.08*** -0.15* -0.03* 0.92 2.65 1987/88 D D 19
(56.58) (5.17) (-1.92) (-2.01)
BH 3.43*** 0.06*** -0.03 -0.05** 0.72 1.42 1990/9? D - 19
(37.47) (3.81) (-0.26) (-2.21)
GJ 3.81*** 0.10** 0.03 -0.08* 0.82 1.99 1988/89 D - 20
(28.1) (0.10) (0.21) (-1.84)
HY 4.1*** 0.16*** 0.03 -0.03*** 0.99 1.47 1988/89 D - 18
(140.96) (27.86) (0.73) (-4.39)
KA 3.8*** 0.05*** 0.08* -0.02** 0.98 1.23 1987/88 D U 20
(103.28) (6.65) (1.92) (-2.41)
KE 4.38*** 0.03*** 0.04 -0.05** 0.84 1.98 1994/95 D - 19
(124.43) (6.54) (0.61) (-2.37)
MP 3.49*** 0.05*** -0.03 -0.03*** 0.97 1.72 1990/91 D - 19
(110.95) (10.43) (-0.68) (-3.54)
MH 4.02*** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.03*** 0.98 1.65 1989/90 D - 18
(150.59) (13.09) (-0.37) (-3.77)
OR 3.56*** 0.06*** 0.05 -0.06*** 0.98 1.41 1989/90 D - 20
(99.05) (10.05) (0.94) (-4.73)
- - 0.01 0.10*** - - 1995/96 U - -
(0.22) (5.18)
PJ 4.34*** 0.04*** 0.16*** -0.09*** 0.95 2.23 1989/90 D U 20
(124.14) (5.67) (3.16) (-5.75)
- - 0.04*** 0.15*** - - 1994/95 U U -
(0.6) (8.04)
RJ 3.70*** 0.07*** -0.08 -0.02** 0.97 1.71 1990/91 D - 20
(96.59) (11.15) (-1.68) (-2.67)
TN - - - - - - 1980/81 N - -
UP 3.42*** 0.06*** 0.21*** -0.09*** 0.93 1.96 1989/90 D U 20
(69.85) (6.97) (3.39) (-8.01)
WB 3.86*** 0.05*** 0.11*** -0.04** 0.93 2.25 1990/91 D U 18
(81.28) (6.1) (1.65) (-2.78)
All States 4.92*** 0.06*** -0.21* -0.01 0.83 2.21 1991/92 - D 20
(63.64) (5.24) (-1.99) (-0.65)
Notes: Same as Table 3  
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Table 5 Evaluation of Health Expenditures
States α β1
β? and β?
(if any)
β? and β?
( if any? R2 D-W Year of Shift
Direction
of Shift
(Level)
Direction
of Shift
(Trend)
No. of
Samples
AP 3.10*** 0.06*** -0.03 -0.06*** 0.90 2.15 1987/88 D - 20
(54.27) (4.35) (-0.47) (-3.93)
- - 0.04 0.11*** - - 1995/96 U - ?
(0.55) (4.62)
AS 2.90*** 0.07*** -0.24* -0.09*** 0.67 2.68 1991/92 D D 19
(30.18) (5.19) (-1.80) (-3.48)
BH 2.62 0.04 -0.26* 0.03 0.58 1.48 1994/95 - D 21
(28.91) (3.43) (-0.14) (0.03)
GJ 3.18*** 0.07** 0.12 -0.06* 0.67 1.80 1986/87 D - 20
(26.33) (2.37) (-0.29) (-1.84)
HY# 3.37*** 0.09*** 0.05 -0.14*** 0.93 2.09 1984/85 D - 19
(43.46) (3.22) (1.41) (-4.94)
- - 0.15** 0.11*** - - 1991/92 U U -
(2.91) (10.75)
KA 2.86*** 0.10*** -0.16* -0.08*** 0.95 1.55 1987/88 D D 20
(46.26) (7.00) (-2.05) (-4.48)
- - 0.04 0.11*** - - 1996/97 U - -
(0.50) (3.23)
KE 3.48*** 0.02** 0.02 -0.04*** 0.45 1.47 1990/91 D - 19
(69.6) (2.39) (0.33) (-2.89)
3.31*** -0.03 -0.16 0.15** 0.89 2.45 1983/84 U - 19
(23.21) ?-0.53? (-1.02) -2.2
- - -0.2* -0.08*** - - 1990/91 D D -
(-2.00) (-4.95)
2.17*** -0.05 0.86** -0.30** 0.95 2.14 1983/84 D U 19
(6.21) (-0.31) (2.28) ('-1.84)
- - 0.22 0.40*** - - 1991/92 U - -
(0.93) (8.05)
MP 3.08*** 0.06*** -0.15** -0.05*** 0.74 1.81 1988/89 D D 18
(58.16) (5.34) (-2.27) (-4.22)
MH 3.26*** 0.11*** -0.03 -0.14*** 0.88 2.62 1985/86 D - 20
(34.3) (3.84) (-0.28) (-4.46)
- - 0.02 0.16*** - - 1994/95 U - -
(0.21) (6.32)
OR 3.08*** 0.04*** -0.06 -0.04*** 0.90 2.24 1988/89 D - 20
(68.53) (4.67) (-1.04) (-3.04)
- - 0.05 0.09*** - - 1996/97 U - -
(0.79) (3.26)
PJ 3.38 0.05 0.15* -0.51** 0.91 2.50 1985/86 D U 20
(51.68) (2.59) (2.03) (-2.40)
- - -0.18** 0.08*** - - 1994/95 U D -
(-2.74) (4.80)
RJ 3.52*** 0.07*** -0.14** -0.03** 0.95 1.27 1988/89 D D 20
(77.57) (7.34) (-2.46) (-2.61)
TN 2.97*** 0.19*** -0.16 -0.17*** 0.87 1.77 1983/84 D - 20
(24.2) (3.41) (-1.22) (-3.01)
UP 2.69*** 0.07*** -0.05 -0.08*** 0.74 2.08 1990/91 D - 20
(37.37) (5.65) (-0.52) (-5.00)
WB 3.23*** 0.02*** 0.07 0.17*** 0.96 2.44 1997/98 U - 21
(122.59) (7.11) (1.41) (7.17)
All States# 4.19*** 0.09*** -0.28*** -0.07*** 0.79 2.77 1987/88 D D 20
(53.1) (5.11) (-2.99) (-3.61)
Notes: Same as Table 3.
KE revenue
expenditure
KE capital
outlay
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Table 6 Evaluation of Economic Service Expendituers
States α β1
β? and β?
(if any)
β? and β?
( if any? R2 D-W Year of Shift
Direction
of Shift
(Level)
Direction
of Shift
(Trend)
No. of
Samples
AP 4.69*** 0.03*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.83 1.55 1994/95 D - 19
(110.66) (6.80) (0.28) (-3.4)
AS 4.41*** 0.04*** -0.09 -0.09*** 0.78 2.62 1991/92 D - 19
(96.66) (6.09) (-1.37) (-6.68)
BH 4.24*** 0.02*** -0.12 -0.18*** 0.87 1.41 1993/94 D - 18
(83.66) (3.12) (-1.46) (-6.50)
GJ 4.86*** 0.05*** -0.2*** 0.06** 0.94 2.00 1994/95 U D 19
(124.6) (10.82) (-2.95) (2.49)
HY 5.34*** 0.01 -0.09 0.08** 0.57 2.43 1995/96 U - 20
(102.73) (1.45) (-1.00) (2.68)
KA 4.75*** 0.03*** -0.18** 0.07** 0.95 2.73 1987/88 U D 20
(103.90) (3.24) (-2.72) (2.69)
- - 0.02 -0.10** - - 1991/92 D - -
(0.20) (-4.04)
KE 4.48*** 0.01 0.15 0.04** 0.84 2.28 1991/92 U - 19
(70.24) (0.80) (1.62) (2.40)
MP - - - - - - 1980/81 N - -
MH 4.95*** 0.05*** -0.17** 0.01 0.91 2.24 1991/92 - D 19
(93.20) (6.62) (-2.29) (0.35)
OR 4.95*** -0.12** 0.24* 0.18*** 0.79 2.10 1983/84 U - 20
(40.82) (-2.19) (1.81) (3.13)
- - -0.05 -0.08*** - - 1990/91 D - -
(-0.63) (-4.57)
PJ 4.79*** 0.09 -0.67** 0.06* 0.61 2.21 1986/87 U D 20
(21.78) (1.56) (-2.36) (0.67)
- - 0.04 -0.16 - - 1991/92 D - -
(0.15) (-2.02)
RJ 4.59*** 0.03** 0.18 -0.06** 0.65 1.32 1991/92 D - 20
(53.44) (2.51) (1.58) (-2.69)
TN 4.56*** 0.03** 0.45*** -0.08*** 0.82 1.60 1991/92 D U 20
(53.60) (2.51) (3.91) (-3.80)
UP 4.42*** 0.04*** -0.08 -0.10*** 0.79 2.72 1990/91 D - 19
(79.37) (4.21) (-1.03) (-7.01)
WB - - - - - - 1980/81 N - -
All States 5.74*** 0.04*** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.95 1.82 1991/92 D - 20
(266.22) (11.34) (0.01) (-6.77)
Notes: Same as Table 3.  
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Table 7 Disbursement of External Aid per state ( 1991/92-1999/00)
State Total amount in crore rupees
Central Government 43865.26
Multiple States 9125.64
AP 6546.95
MH 5193.71
UP 4146.40
TN 3680.87
WB 2905.88
GJ 2382.88
KA 2189.15
OR 1740.87
RJ 1302.18
MP 923.27
HY 815.38
PJ 571.76
BH 446.46
KE 439.97
AS 80.24
Note: Same as Table 1.
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Finance?2000b).  
 
 
Figure 1?Social Services Expenditures as a Share of Total
Expenditures in Selected States (%)
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Sources: Compiled from Reserve Bank of India, Finances of State Governments, various years. 
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Figure 2 Social Services Expenditures as a Share of NSDP in
Selected States (%)
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Sources: Compiled from RBI, Finances of State Governments, various years and RBI (2001). 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Education and Health Expenditures as a Share of
NSDP in Selected States (%)
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Sources: Same as Figure 2. 
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Figure 4  Real Per Capita Social Services Expenditures in
Selected States (1980/81 prices, rupees)
50
100
150
200
250
300
80/81 82/83 84/85 86/87 88/89 90/91 92/93 94/95 96/97 98/99
Rs
KE average for the 4 highest-income states
RJ average for the 4 lowest-income states  
Sources:  Compiled from RBI, Finances of State Governments, various years, RBI (2001)?
Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract India, various years. 
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